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 The discussion convened by OSU’s Election Law program on May 4 
focused, in its first session, on the possibility of litigation in the November 
presidential election arising from the failure of many Philadelphia voters to 
receive absentee ballots that they had properly and timely requested under 
Pennsylvania law. This hypothetical scenario was modeled in large part on the 
real-world electoral crisis that had occurred in Wisconsin during its April 
primary, when as many as 14,000 voters failed to receive an absentee ballot 
before Election Day, even though these voters had complied with the state’s 
statutory deadline for requesting an absentee ballot. Local election officials had 
become overwhelmed with the large volume of these requests and could not 
handle administratively their responsibility to deliver a ballot to voters so that 
there would be time for voters to cast these ballots in the election. 
As a result, Wisconsin voters sued in federal district court seeking a remedy 
that would permit them additional time to return their absentee ballots so that 
they would count. The district court granted emergency relief, specifying that 
voters would have six additional days after Election Day, April 7, in which to 
cast and return their absentee ballots. In RNC v. DNC, however, a majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court objected to a portion of the district court’s decree. While 
the Supreme Court accepted the district court’s ruling insofar as it required 
absentee ballots cast and postmarked on or before Election Day to be counted if 
local election officials received them within the next six days, the Supreme 
Court negated the district court’s order insofar as it required the counting of 
ballots cast after Election Day had passed. The majority explained: “Extending 
the date by which ballots may be cast by voters—not just received by the 
municipal clerks but cast by voters—for an additional six days after the 
scheduled election day fundamentally alters the nature of the election.” 
The Philadelphia-based hypothetical scenario discussed in the May 4 event 
was designed to consider whether the outcome of litigation would be different 
if the district court had fashioned a different form of remedy to protect voters 
from the disenfranchisement caused by failure to receive a timely requested 
absentee ballot. One alternative form of remedy would be to permit absentee 
voters who do not receive their absentee ballots, as they should have, to 
download a substitute ballot and, after printing it out, cast and postmark it on or 
before Election Day. This kind of substitute absentee ballot is already available 
for military and overseas voters. Known as the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot 
(FWAB), it is required by Congress to protect military and overseas voters from 
just the kind of disenfranchisement that thousands of Wisconsin voters suffered. 
What if the district court had ordered that a FWAB-like substitute be available 
to any voter who had properly requested an absentee ballot under state law but 
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who had not yet received it by Election Day? Or, looking ahead to November, 
what if the same type of problem arises, and a court is asked to protect voters 
from this type of disenfranchisement. 
The discussion of this topic on May 4 was illuminating but not definitive. 
Many participants said that they would need to see the specific circumstances 
of litigation over a judicially crafted FWAB-like remedy in order to assess its 
validity. Consequently, the following is an attempt to spell out the facts of a 
hypothetical scenario and put them in the form of a hypothetical U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion, so that readers can appraise for themselves whether they would 
agree or disagree with a ruling that distinguishes RNC v. DNC and upholds the 
validity of a FWAB-like remedy against a federal constitutional challenge. 
Since May 4, this year’s problems in the administration of elections have 
also included the massive failures in Georgia on June 9, where voters in multiple 
polling locations were waiting in line for up to seven hours. Accordingly, the 
idea arises whether a FWAB-like remedy might also be suitable for voters 
disenfranchised by this long-line situation. What if a court, in response to an 
emergency motion on Election Day, ordered that voters who had been waiting 
in line for over one hour but who were unable to wait in line any longer would 
be entitled to cast a FWAB-like ballot instead as long as it was postmarked on 
Election Day? Would that be a constitutionally acceptable remedy and, given 
the ruling in RNC v. DNC, more advisable than a judicial decree that permitted 
voters to cast a ballot on some day subsequent to Election Day itself? 
The following hypothetical opinion incorporates this long-line problem into 
the facts of the case. It is thus designed to test one’s views about the use of a 
FWAB-like remedy to redress two forms of disenfranchisement: (1) the failure 
of receive a timely requested absentee ballot; and (2) the inability to vote at the 
polls despite waiting in line for over an hour. (It would be possible to choose 
two hours, rather than one, as the point at which this FWAB-like remedy would 
become available, with voters having to attest to the length of their wait in line; 
but if it were constitutionally permissible for a state court to order this remedy 
for voters suffering a two-hour wait, would the remedy no longer be 
constitutional for only a one-hour wait? The main issue would seem to be where 
a state court could go down this remedial road at all. It is a significant distinction 
between RNC v. DNC and this hypothetical case that the latter involves U.S. 
Supreme Court review of a state supreme court decision, rather than review of 
a lower federal court’s order.) If contrary to the reasoning and conclusion of this 
hypothetical opinion this type of remedy is not constitutionally permissible for 
either form of disenfranchisement, then is the inevitable conclusion that such 
disenfranchisement must be considered constitutionally acceptable in the event 
that either type of administrative breakdown of the voting process occurs?  
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This year’s elections, including the popular vote that state legislatures have 
authorized for purposes of appointing presidential electors, has been conducted 
under extraordinarily difficult conditions as a consequence of the coronavirus 
pandemic. The challenges of conducting these elections in the conventional 
mode of voting in person at a neighborhood polling location on Election Day, 
where there is a risk of spreading the deadly virus even with sound protocols for 
social distancing and other hygienic practices in place, has caused an 
unprecedented spike in applications to vote by mail, where that option is 
available to voters by state law. It has also caused a shortage of poll workers to 
administer the voting process at polling locations on Election Day.  
Pennsylvania is one of many states that has struggled to handle these 
challenges successfully. As Election Day approached it became increasingly 
apparent that thousands of the state’s voters, especially in Philadelphia, would 
not receive the vote-by-mail ballot that they had properly requested pursuant to 
newly enacted provisions of Pennsylvania law. Moreover, on Election Day 
itself, many voters—in Philadelphia and elsewhere—faced waiting times of 
several hours. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has attempted to ameliorate 
these conditions, but its efforts are now challenged here as unconstitutional. 
President Donald Trump, as a candidate for reelection and the lead 
petitioner here, specifically asks this Court to hold that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has violated the U.S. Constitution by construing its own state 
constitution to require the counting of emergency vote-by-mail ballots made 
available to voters who properly had applied for a regular vote-by-mail ballot 
but who not yet had received it by Election Day, November 3. In a subsequent 
ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also ordered the counting of these 
emergency ballots if cast by any voter who, after waiting in line for more than 
one hour to vote in person at a polling place on November 3, signed an affidavit 
that the voter was unable wait in line any longer and therefore needed to cast an 
emergency vote-by-mail ballot in order to avoid disenfranchisement. President 
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Trump and his co-petitioners also claim this additional ruling violates the federal 
Constitution.  
We reject both federal constitutional claims and hold instead that 
Pennsylvania may count emergency ballots cast by eligible and registered voters 
so long as those ballots are cast on or before Election Day and are offered to 
voters in a truly emergency situation in furtherance of the obligation, imposed 
by both state and federal constitutional law, to provide an equal opportunity of 
all voters to cast a timely ballot in the same statewide election. 
I 
 In advance of this year’s election, Pennsylvania adopted a new system of 
no-excuse vote-by-mail, meaning that any eligible and registered voter who 
would prefer this method of casting a ballot, rather than going in person to a 
precinct polling place, would be entitled to choose this method without needing 
to justify this choice. According to the new statute enacted by the state’s 
legislature, if a voter applies for a vote-by-mail ballot by the deadline (5 p.m. 
on the Tuesday before Election Day, 25 P.S. § 3150.12a), the county board of 
elections “shall deliver or mail” the ballot to the voter within “48 hours” of 
receiving the application. 25 P.S. § 3150.15. The statute, in turn, obligates the 
voter to return the cast ballot by 8 p.m. on Election Day. 25 P.S. § 3150.16. As 
the state’s own official website emphasized to voters, “postmarks are not 
enough” and instead “VOTED BALLOTS must be RECEIVED by your county 
election office” within this statutory deadline.  
 As this year’s general election on November 3 approached, however, it 
became increasingly clear that some local elections boards, including 
Philadelphia‘s, were unable to comply with their own obligation to send ballots 
to voters within the 48-hour turnaround time specified by the state statute. 
Because of the extraordinarily large volume of applications for these ballots, 
triggered by the coronavirus pandemic, local election officials simply could not 
keep pace with the applications and a backlog had developed. It became evident 
that many thousands of voters (over 10,000 and perhaps even 50,000, according 
to both official statistics and media reports), who had properly requested ballots 
by the statutory deadline of October 27, would not even receive a ballot by 
Election Day, November 3, much less be able to return it by then, because local 
election officials still had been unable to process these timely applications—in 
violation of their own statutory obligation to do so within 48 hours.  
 Respondents here, including former Vice President Joe Biden and his 
presidential campaign, filed an emergency petition in the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, asking the court to provide a remedy that would avoid the 
disenfranchisement of qualified voters who had complied with state law in 
applying for a vote-by-mail ballot. The court granted the petition, ordering that 
any voter whose vote-by-mail application had been received by the statutory 
deadline of 5 p.m. on October 27, but whose application has not been processed 
within 48 hours later as required by state law (as demonstrated by the local 
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election board’s own records on its handling of absentee ballot applications), 
would be entitled to cast a substitute emergency vote-by-mail ballot that the 
state would be obligated to count as a valid ballot as long as it had been delivered 
or postmarked by 8 p.m. on Election Day, November 3. The court further 
explained that, as a model for the type of emergency vote-by-mail ballot that 
would be appropriate, the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) available 
to military and oversea     s voters could be extended to cover this additional 
emergency circumstance. In essence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decreed 
that voters in the covered situation—having timely applied for a regular vote-
by-mail ballot but whose application had been unlawfully delayed beyond the 
statutory 48-hour period—were entitled to utilize the downloadable FWAB in 
this emergency situation, although the state’s chief elections officer (Secretary 
of State Kathy Boockvar, a respondent here) could provide a state-specific 
alternative to the FWAB as long as it was functionally equivalent in permitting 
a voter to cast a ballot and avoid disenfranchisement (and also as long as the 
state-specific alternative was uniform statewide, so that there was no danger of 
local variation in voting opportunities available to similarly situated voters in 
the same statewide election). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its 
decision on both the statutory violation committed by local election officials in 
missing their 48-hour turnaround obligation and in the state constitution’s 
guarantee of a “free and equal” election.  
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rendered its decision on Friday, October 
30. Petitioners, including President Donald Trump and his reelection campaign, 
immediately sought a stay in this Court. The next day, October 31, we issued an 
order providing that no emergency ballot cast pursuant to the state court’s order 
would be entitled to be counted absent further order of this Court, but that the 
state and local election officials were not enjoined in receiving any emergency 
ballot cast pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decree, and that this 
Court would hear argument in the case on Wednesday, November 4, after 
briefing from both sides. On November 1, the Pennsylvania Department of State 
released a directive informing voters that they were entitled to use either the 
existing FWAB according to the terms set forth in the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision or a state-specific alternative that the Department of State had 
fashioned as permitted by the court’s decision and made available on its own 
website. 
 Meanwhile, Election Day occurred on November 3. Early in the morning, 
excessively long lines began to develop at multiple polling locations in 
Philadelphia and elsewhere in the state. Evidence showed these lines were 
largely attributable to an insufficient number of poll workers, caused in part by 
“no shows”—individuals who had agreed serve as poll workers but who 
ultimately did not report for duty, likely because of increased fears concerning 
a new spike in Covid-19 cases during the week prior to Election Day. Pursuant 
to another emergency petition filed by the Biden campaign, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court at 3 p.m. released a second decree announcing that any voter 
who had been standing in line at a polling place for over one hour that day was 
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entitled to use the FWAB, or the Department of State’s equivalent emergency 
ballot, if in submitting their ballot they included a sworn notation that they were 
unable to wait in line any longer and instead were using this emergency ballot 
as the only means available to cast their votes. The state supreme court made 
clear that, as with its initial ruling on October 30, these emergency ballots would 
be eligible to be counted as long as they were postmarked or delivered to the 
appropriate county election board, including in designated drop boxes, by 8 p.m. 
that same day, November 3. 
 Later in the evening of Election Day, petitioners filed a supplemental brief 
in this Court arguing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s second order, like 
its first, violates the federal Constitution. Late that same night, we clarified that 
our previous order, preventing any ballots challenged by petitioners from being 
counted absent further order of this Court, extended to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s second ruling as well as its first. Oral argument before this 
Court the next morning, November 4, encompassed consideration of both 
rulings by the state supreme court.  
 We now issue this decision.  
II 
 Petitioners argue that it violates the federal Constitution for the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to alter Pennsylvania law governing the conduct 
of the current election, in a way that deviates from the explicit and unambiguous 
requirements set forth by the state’s legislature in its statutory text, after ballots 
already have begun to be cast in the midst of this specific election. In making 
this federal constitutional argument, petitioners rest on two alternative theories. 
First, petitioners assert that deviating from the plain statutory text in the way 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did violates the authority of the state’s 
legislature, as vested by Article II of the federal Constitution, to determine the 
manner of appointing the state’s presidential electors. Second, petitioners claim 
that to change state law in the middle of an election, as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court did, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 We consider each of these alternative arguments in turn.  
A 
 Article II of the U.S. Constitution provides: “Each state shall appoint, in 
such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal 
to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be 
entitled in the Congress.” (Emphasis added     ). In Bush v. Palm Beach 
Canvassing Board, this Court unanimously expressed concern that the Florida 
Supreme Court had deviated from the state’s statutory rules for conducting a 
popular vote to appoint the state’s presidential electors—and that this deviation 
was such as to violate the state legislature’s Article II authority to choose the 
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manner of appointing the electors. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).  Finding 
ambiguity in the Florida Supreme Court’s decision under review, however, we 
remanded the case for clarification rather than ruling definitively on the claim 
of a constitutional violation before us there.  
 In Bush v. Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence (joined by Justice 
Scalia and JUSTICE THOMAS) would have found the Florida Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision involving the disputed 2000 presidential election a 
violation of Article II, reasoning that it was an excessive distortion of the 
applicable state statutes as enacted by the Florida legislature. 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). The Court’s per curiam majority opinion, however, did not rest on this 
Article II analysis, but instead held that the Florida Supreme Court had violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by approving a 
statewide recount that permitted county-by-county variation (and even within 
single counties ballot-by-ballot variation) in the assessment of whether 
physically identical ballots were entitled to be counted. The four dissenting 
opinions in Bush v. Gore rejected the Article II claim in the case, believing the 
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion to be a plausible interpretation of the state’s 
applicable statute even if that interpretation was not correct or even the most 
reasonable one.  
 Here, we reject the claim that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has violated 
Article II by usurping the state legislature’s constitutional authority to determine 
the manner in which the state’s presidential electors are appointed. While 
recognizing that there could indeed be circumstances in which a state court ‘s 
purported interpretation of a state statute would be so egregious as to be that 
type of usurpation in violation of Article II, this case is not one that presents 
such circumstances. Rather than distorting the statutory rules for conducting a 
statewide popular vote to appoint electors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 
providing a remedy for the violation of those statutory rules caused by the failure 
of local election boards to deliver vote-by-mail ballots within the 48-hour period 
statutorily specified to voters who properly requested them.  
 To be sure, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remedy permits vote-by-
mail ballots to be counted as long as they are postmarked by 8 p.m. on Election 
Day, rather than being received at the local board of elections by that time. 
Petitioners contend that this remedy is an impermissible rewriting of the 
legislature’s statutory language, which explicitly and unambiguously provides 
(except for military and overseas voters, who are covered by separate rules): “a 
completed mail-in ballot must be received in the office of the county board of 
elections no later than eight o’clock P.M. on the day of the primary or election.” 
25 P.S. § 3150.16. Petitioners argue that to rewrite the statutory deadline for the 
submission of vote-by-mail ballots in this way must amount to a contravention 
of the state legislature’s Article II authority to determine the method for 
appointing the state’s presidential electors. 
 We disagree. We view the statutory obligation of voters to return their 
completed ballots by 8 p.m. on Election Day as part of the overall statutory rules 
that the legislature adopted for vote-by-mail. These rules also included the 
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statutory obligation of local election officials to deliver ballots to voters within 
48 hours after receiving a voter’s timely request, so that the voters would be able 
to comply with their own statutory deadline for returning their ballots. Once the 
prerequisite part of the statutory scheme had been violated by the local 
government officials themselves, it was no longer possible to enforce the 
deadline set for voters in order to effectuate the plan of the overall statutory 
structure.  
 It is evident that the Pennsylvania legislature’s objective was to have the 
state’s presidential electors chosen by a popular vote in which all of the state ‘s 
eligible voters had an opportunity to participate. Furthermore, by adopting its 
new vote-by-mail procedures, the legislature wanted to provide vote-by-mail as 
a method of voting that all eligible voters, at their own discretion, were entitled 
to choose as their preferred means of casting a ballot. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s remedy for the local government’s failure to deliver vote-by-
mail ballots before Election Day to voters who had properly requested them, 
rather than distorting the will of the legislature concerning the manner of 
appointing the state’s presidential electors, was as preservative of the 
legislature’s will as possible in light of the local government’s own statutory 
violation. While in other contexts it is possible that a state judicial decree might 
contravene the legislature’s choice on the manner of appointing electors, in this 
case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decree was consonant with the 
legislature’s choice and thus not a violation of Article II.  
 Petitioners also argue that the use of emergency “absentee” ballots as a 
form of voting for voters waiting in line at their polling place on November 3 
for over one hour is not an electoral procedure provided for by Pennsylvania’s 
statutory law and therefore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ‘s adoption of this 
procedure in response to a perceived problem of excessively long lines at the 
polls was another type of rewriting of the state’s applicable statutory law in 
usurpation of the legislature’s Article II authority. We acknowledge that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remedy was unorthodox, and we share the 
concern that without adequate security measures permitting voters to cast a last-
minute absentee ballot when they had not requested one previously, just because 
they encounter some problem or inconvenience when they go to the polls on 
Election Day, has the potential for mischief that conceivably could undermine 
the integrity of the election. We expect that, before counting any ballot cast in 
this unorthodox manner, election officials would engage in extra scrutiny to 
verify its authenticity, and it would be essential to permit any candidate to 
challenge a specific ballot as uncountable because it could not be adequately 
verified as cast by an eligible voter who otherwise would have been 
disenfranchised because of excessively long lines at the polls on Election Day.  
 Even so, we do not believe that the mere fact that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court authorized this unorthodox procedure, without more, necessarily 
violates the legislature’s Article II authority to choose the manner of appointing 
presidential electors. As just stated, the main feature of the method that 
Pennsylvania’s legislature has chosen is that the appointment of its electors shall 
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be made by a popular vote of the statewide constituency. Excessively long lines 
at the polls on Election Day, which cause voters to abandon their place in line 
without having cast a ballot because after waiting for hours already they can 
wait no longer, contravenes the legislature’s chosen method for appointing the 
state’s electors. The popular vote is not a fair or accurate reflection of the 
statewide constituency’s will if part of that constituency, as a practical matter, 
is unable to cast a ballot because of grossly unreasonable waiting times at local 
polling places.  
 We have found nothing in Pennsylvania’s statutory law that explicitly 
precludes the use of emergency absentee ballots as a means of remediating an 
acute problem of excessive wait times developing at polling places on Election 
Day. We do find in Pennsylvania’s statutes specific measures aimed at avoiding 
lengthy lines at the polls, including a longstanding rule that no voter is permitted 
to spend “more than three minutes” casting a ballot by use of a voting machine 
in limited supply at the polling place unless other voters “are not waiting to 
vote” at the time. 25 P.S. § 3057. (Pennsylvania statutory law also already 
permits military and overseas voters to return their absentee ballots up to a week 
after Election Day, and therefore to permit additional emergency absentee 
ballots to arrive within this same statutory deadline would not unduly impair the 
administration of this election     ). 
Moreover, given news reports that by midday in Philadelphia on November 
3, the waiting time to vote in many polling places had already exceeded three 
hours, the state was facing a crisis that warranted some form of emergency 
response. One advantage of the response the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
adopted, while recognizing its countervailing disadvantages, was that it avoided 
the need to consider the possibility of opening the polls for an extra day of 
voting, either in Philadelphia or statewide. In light of all the logistical and other 
complexities that would have been associated with that different form of 
remediation, as well as our specific admonition recently against judicial 
alteration of an election that would permit the casting of ballots on days 
subsequent to Election Day itself, see RNC v DNC, we cannot say that it was 
unreasonable for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to choose the remedy that it 
did. 589 U.S. ___ (2020). Allowing a voter who can no longer wait in line to 
cast an emergency absentee ballot, especially when these emergency ballots 
already have been made available to voters who did not receive the official vote-
by-mail ballot that they properly requested, has the virtue of disrupting the 
election as minimally as possible. It also confines the election to ballots cast on 
or before Election Day, thus respecting an essential feature of the election as 
originally intended by the legislature.  
 Based on all these considerations, we concluded that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court did not violate Article II. 
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 Petitioners rely primarily on two appellate court precedents for the 
proposition that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court violated due process by 
changing the rules concerning the counting of vote-by-mail ballots after the 
casting of ballots had commenced in this election. In Griffin v. Burns, the court 
held that it violated due process for a state supreme court to invalidate absentee 
ballots cast by voters after the secretary of the state, as the chief elections officer 
in the state, had instructed voters that absentee ballots were a permissible 
method of voting in the election. , 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). The “gotcha” 
aspect of voiding ballots cast by voters after they had already cast them in 
reliance on the rules as provided by the government itself was the core of the 
appellate court’s due process holding. 
 In Roe v. Alabama,           the court held that it violated due process to count 
absentee ballots that did not comply with the state ‘s statutory requirement that 
such ballots be notarized or have two witnesses. 68 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995). 
After a trial that confirmed the state’s previous practice of conducting elections 
to be almost uniformly consistent with this statutory requirement, the court ruled 
that it would violate fundamental fairness to abandon this statutory rule in the 
middle of the election, after ballots had been cast but before they had been 
counted. To do that, the court reasoned, would be equivalent to stuffing the 
ballot box after the polls closed with invalid ballots. Moreover, it would be 
unfair to eligible voters who, relying on the rules as they existed when the 
particular election began, decided against attempting to cast an absentee ballot 
because the notarization-or-two-witness obligation was more onerous than the 
would-be voters wished to undertake. 
 We do not dispute the soundness of these precedents. Even assuming that 
due process precludes changing the rules for counting ballots after they were 
cast in the ways that the state governments did in either of these two precedents, 
this case is different.     . No voter here relied upon the statutory deadline of 
delivering vote-by-mail ballots to local election officials by 8 p.m. rather than 
postmarking them by that same deadline. No voter has been denied fundamental 
fairness by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s efforts to remedy the 
disenfranchisement of eligible voters that would be caused by the failure of local 
election officials to administer elections properly according to the statutes in 
existence. 
 Not every deviation from electoral procedures set forth in state statutes 
violates due process, even if those deviations occur after the process for casting 
ballots in the particular election has begun. To be sure, such deviations 
inevitably raise suspicions and should be generally frowned upon. Sometimes, 
moreover, such deviations will be unconstitutional as an improper attempt to 
subvert an election. See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 605-608 (1990) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 But due process analysis is context-dependent. Here, as we have already 
explained, the state government itself already was in violation of its own 
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statutory rules for conducting this election. These violations led to demands for 
some form of remediation, under state law if not federal law, and the state 
supreme court chose a method of remediation calculated to be most congruent 
with the overall structure and objectives of the state’s election laws. See 
generally Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies, 67 Emory L. J. 545 (2018); 
for a Pennsylvania precedent on this point, see In re General Election-1985, 531 
A.2d 836 (Pa. 1987). 
 Moreover, it is necessary for elections to comply with equal protection as 
well as due process. In numerous cases, starting with Reynolds v. Sims, this 
Court has held that the administration of elections must comply with the basic 
proposition that each eligible voter in a state has an equal right to participate in 
an election on essentially equal terms with each other eligible voter. 377 U.S. 
533 (1964). For sake of simplicity, we and others have called this principle “one 
person, one vote.” Cf. Bush v. Gore, supra, at 105 (applying this equal protection 
principle in a recount context). Although there are inevitable complexities in the 
implementation of this constitutional principle in particular circumstances, we 
have never abandoned the core proposition that this principle is an enforceable 
constitutional command.  
 In this election, there was considerable danger that without some form of 
emergency remediation the state would be in violation of the “equal opportunity 
to vote” constitutional principle. At the time that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court rendered its October 30 decision     , some voters in the same statewide 
election had received their vote-by-mail ballots without delay, whereas other 
voters in the same election—and who had submitted their ballot applications on 
the same date as the first group of voters—had not. This difference in treatment 
of equivalent voters, with the consequence that one group would be able to cast 
a ballot in the election while the other group would not, understandably raised 
equal protection concerns. Likewise, on Election Day itself, in some polling 
locations in the same election voters were unable to receive a ballot to cast even 
after waiting more than three hours, while other voters in the same election were 
able to cast a ballot with a minimal wait or no wait at all. While we do not need 
to decide definitively that this differential treatment of equally eligible voters in 
the same election violates the federal constitutional requirement of equal 
protection (and the well-settled doctrine that federal courts should refrain from 
unnecessary constitutional pronouncements counsels against doing so), it 
suffices to acknowledge that the state’s interest in avoiding this constitutionally 
problematic differential treatment of equivalent voters is adequate grounds for 
adjusting procedures in the pending election—especially when the difference in 
treatment is a consequence of the state’s failure to follow its own statutory 
requirements. Just as there is some “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,       so too must 
there be room for state and local election officials to maneuver between potential 
violations of equal protection, on the one hand, and due process, on the other. 
Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). A justifiable concern that the state 
would violate equal protection if it failed to remedy an electoral inequality of its 
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own making, as here, can immunize the state from liability under the Due 
Process Clause for making a modest and suitably tailored adjustment in the 
enforcement of its existing election statutes in this limited respect.  
 In neither Griffin v. Burns nor Roe v. Alabama was a change in state law 
necessary to address an equal protection concern. In Griffin, there was no risk 
that counting absentee ballots cast by voters who had relied on the secretary of 
state’ss directives would harm any other voter in the same election. Similarly, 
in Roe there was no claim that disqualification of absentee ballots that failed to 
comply with the statutory rules for casting them—rules that had been uniformly 
applied in previous elections—would violate the equal protection rights of 
equivalent voters. Thus, Griffin and Roe are readily distinguishable, because 
here without the remedy provided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court there 
would be a strong argument that the state was denying equal protection to 
equivalent voters by failing to provide them equal opportunities to cast a ballot 
in the same statewide election.  
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the partial stay of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’ss rulings under review are hereby now lifted, and this matter is remanded 
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.  
 
      It is so ordered. 
 
 
*  Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Chair in Constitutional 
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